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For brevity Appellees Martin and Darlene Houck will not restate Appellants
Jurisdiction, Issues Presented For Review, Determinative Statutes, Rules And
Regulations, nor Statement of the Case as it pertains to nature of case and course of
pleadings. .Appellees will address issues covered in the Statement Of Facts because
Appellees disagree with these statements and feel that they should be clarified.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Numbers 1 through 5 will not be addressed. Beginning with Statement #6 which
pertains to the property elevation difference: For clarification, Appellees Houck do not
refute that elevation differences have existed but Appellants' property has a pile of
manure on Appellants' side of the adjoining property line, which Appellants' have built
up the height of since July 2004, but state that if their irrigation water management is
done correctly flooding is not an issue. Water management is the clue to control the
water shed between elevations. Appellees' property has had no Appellants' irrigation
water on it since the July 2004 letter. R.545, 82: 12-25 R. 83: 1-2 R. 344 15 & 16.
Statement #7: Appellants' statement that irrigation water on both properties flows
from the South to the North, while this is true, Appellees property is located to the West
of Appellants' property.
Statement #8: Not addressing.
Statement #9: Appellants' statement "despite the fact that is where the water
flowed"
Appellants' home is constructed on the North end of their property. Irrigation
water on these properties does flow from the South to the North, however, Appellees
1

were not aware when they bought the property that Appellants' irrigation water flowed
onto Appellees property in an east to west direction when their irrigation water was not
managed correctly. Appellants' addressing in Statement #9 "the water", not Appellants'
water. R. 550 & 551, 39: 1-25 & 42: 1-23 R. 606 20: 11-13
Statement #10: Appellants' address a "further action" meaning in the July 8,2004
letter as to imply the legal definition of these words. Appellees are not schooled in the
legal profession, so, to imply that Appellees are applying that definition to those words is
incorrect, Appellees, as stated in their depositions, did not intend the legal definition.
R. 567 305: 9-14 R. 567 305: 9-14 R. 597 89: 20-25 R. 597 90: 1-8
Statement #11: Appellants' state that an "effort to resolve it", Appellees statement
is that if you call the two Appellants' exhibiting child like behaviors with Appellant
Lewis only addressing what business Appellee Darlene had in writing the letter and
Appellant Afton only expounding on the Appellants personal issues against Appellees
and their property. Appellees do not consider Appellants' discourse as a "resolution".
Neither Appellants', while at the Appellees' door, in their discourse, denied
the flooding; in fact, Appellant Afton asked "what do you want us to do". Appellee
Darlene response was to keep their water off of our property.
Also in Statement #11, Appellants' further state that Appellants' were using
profanity at Appellee Darlene. Appellees have never stated that Appellant Afton used
profanity.
R. 544 92: 11-25 R.570 282: 18-25 R.572 260: 5-11 R.572 262: 5-13 R.573 254: 13-16
R.594 115: 1-25 R.594 116: 1-15 R.595 105: 16-25 R.595 106: 1-9 R. 596 102: 23-25
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R. 596 103: 1-24R.597 95: 19-25 R. 597 98: 1-25 R.598 88: 18-25 R. 597 90:24 - 96:
21
Statement #12: If Appellant is addressing the Statement 11 incident in this
statement regarding while Appellants' were at Appellees door, Appellants' never denied
the flooding PERIOD.
Statement #13 Not Addressing.
Statement #14: Contrary to this statement about Appellees exhibiting great
hostilities towards Appellants, Appellees have tolerated being flooded by Appellants'
contaminated irrigation water throughout the years; never exhibiting anger or
frustration towards Appellants. In fact, throughout both Appellees depositions we
cited examples of being good neighbors . (R. 610 95:19)
The great hostilities exhibited were Appellants' towards Appellees through the
flagrant disregard of a neighbors property by the years of trespass by contaminated
irrigation water, prohibiting Appellees from the normal use of their property,
jeopardizing the health of the Appellees corralled animals along the Appellees easterly
fenceline, plus the nuisance of having to work in wet conditions. (R. 556 93: 2-19)
Subsequently to the July 2004 letter asking Appellants to discontinue the flooding
Appellees have been subjected to years of threatening behavior exhibited at them by
Appellant Lewis. These threatening behaviors necessitated that Appellees seek
protection from local law enforcement in lieu of taking matters in their own hands.
Appellees have had to endure the childish exhibition incident wherein Appellants'
Lewis profane words and Appellant Afton threatening statement about making Lewis
mad; that he never forgets; we have had threats of violence from Appellants' son
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Nicholas; we have been denied access to irrigation water, the right to which we have
been entitled to and have enjoyed during our ownership of this land, illegally denied us
by Appellants' counsel (son) Jason.
Except for one occasion (where Appellant Lewis appearing unexpectedly at the
Appellees property taking pictures Appellee Martin did say a profane word to Appellant
Lewis) Appellees have never reciprocated "in kind" to Appellants threats.
Appellees can not go anywhere in this area without feeling the need to look over
our shoulder to see where Appellants9 are lurking. Again, there have bee hostilities
exhibited, but they have been Appellants' towards Appellees.
R. 537 145: 13-15 R. 544 90: 23-25 91: 1-25 R. 545 82: 12-23, 85: 2- 86:19, 87: 19-25
R. 547 72: 13-16 R. 548 59: 11-17 60: 1-24 R549 52: 22-24 R. 595 105: 16-18 R. 598
85: 1-25 86:6-17R. 600 71: 21-24
Statement #15: This May 12, 2006 incident did not happen as was stated.
Appellee Martin's vehicle never entered Appellants' property. During an excess
water incident Appellants' son Nicholas incited a verbal altercation with Appellee
Martin; during the ongoing heated discussion, Appellant Afton came out of the
house and joined in on the conversation. Appellees concur that the minor children,
which Appellant Afton brought out of the house with her, should have not been
subjected to the verbiage being expressed between the parties; Appellant Afton should
never have brought children into that environment.
It is Appellants' contention that this incident started between Appellant Afton and
Appellee Martin, when in fact as our proof we cite all of the references below where
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throughout the proceedings Appellants' counsel refer to the incident as to Appellants'
son Nicholas and Appellee Martin, not Afton. Not until Appellant Afton's Affidavit and
Appelant's son Nicholas' Affidavit did this event get changed as to it being between
Appellant Afton and Appellee Martin.
As for Appellants' Afton & Lewis Affidavits (857 866) and to Nicholas and Jason
Pintar's Affidavits (851 1179), Appellees choose not to address "he said, she said"
heresay, not proofs, extolled in their Affidavits. Appellees state that they strongly
disagree with their perceptions and allegations, and it is unfortunate that they jeopardize
their respective integrities by using this material.
As for the Neeves Affidavit (845), Appellees feel that it is ambiguous and disagree
with its contents.
R. 519 264: 1-5 R. 541 113:1-25 114: 1-25 115: 1-25 116: 1-25 117: 1-25
118: 1-25 119: 25 R. 542 111: 7-8 R. 543 99: 23-24 R. 570 276: 20-21 R. 572
119:12-25 266:4-13 R. 586 183: 10-21 R. 589 158: 15-17 R. 590 149:8-11
R. 592 129: 5-14 R. 593 121: 17-18 R. 851 2: 4 R. 857 4: 10 AlsoPg. 14 of
Appellants' brief #19 R. 1292 16:10.
Statement #16: Not Addressing
Statement #17: Appellees did call Appellee Tonya Houck, who responded
that Appellees should call Dispatch for help.
Statement #18: Not Addressing
Statement #19: Even though Appellant Lewis was not a party to this confortation,
because of his previous threatening behaviors, Appellees developed anxieties in
anticipation of a repeat of Appellants' overreaction again. Appellees would like to
point out again Appellants' reference to the confortation as being between
5

Nicholas and Martin, not Afton and Martin.
Statement #20: We can not speak for the actions of Deputy Morgan.
Statement #21; Appellees strongly refute the Appellant Afton's denial
of the "monkeys" incident. Appellees hold steadfast to their story that this
"monkeys'" occurrence did happen. R. 589 153: 1-25 154:1-25 155: 1-25 156:1-25
R. 538 137: 2-25 138:1-12
Statement #22: Regarding the "flag rising ceremony" Appellees stand firm on
their statements that this event did take place. R. 588 158: 24 thru 166: 10 R.538
138: 13 thru 142: 25
Statement #23: Appellants' comment in this statement as to when the incident
took place is ambiguous, as there were several incidences of Marty being
"flipped off by Appellant Lewis after the July 2004 letter.
Statement #24: Appellees can not speaJc for Deputy Morgan,
Statement #25: Appellants' Brief, page 5, "i" stipulates threatening behavior
as a determinative statute. Subsequent to the July 2004 letter from Appellants' to
Appellees, the crux of Appellant Lewis' behavior has been one of threatening, as have
the aforementioned Afton, Nicholas and Jason Pintars threats.
Statements 26, 27 & 28 are part of the records.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Trial Court correctly ruled that Deputy Morgan was not a policy maker for
Utah County and in the absence of evidence that Deputy Morgans' actions constituted
6

official policy, also that her decisions were reviewed and ratified by those having
official policy making authority; the Appellants did not bring forth any allegations
that official Utah County policy was unconstitutional, and Appellants inability to
state which claims could relief be granted upon, were the courts' findings with regard to
arguments # 1 and 2.
Regarding the Second Amended Complaint filing attempt, because of discovery
timing issues which we have spelled out; the fact that the proposed additional language
would have altered the landscape of the original complaint; because Appellants knew of
the proposed facts at the time that the original complaint was filed, or shortly thereafter,
the proposed amendment should have been brought sooner; that the Appellees discovery
was considered closed it was inappropriate to add new issues; Appellants did not offer
any more specifics and instead simply relied on overboard, conclusory allegations which
are simply not enough to sustain this cause of action, therefore, the Court denied this
filing attempt.
Regarding the declaratory relief as to the Houcks: Under this request Appellants
contend that they should maintain the right to continue irrigating their property as they
have traditionally done, requesting the court to grant them the right for any run over
onto Appellees property to be legal; and if it happens so be it, any defensive methods
to withhold the runoff water is the obligation of the Appellees to undertake. Appelants
must use reasonable care in the use of their wate so as not to damage the property of
their neighbors.
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There is ambiguity in the declaratory request, Appellants did not state what
"matters" were to be addressed in a declaratory judgment.
Appellants can not deny Appellees their right to receive irrigation water from
Westfield Irrigation Company irregardless of whether it is a regular or excess water
turn, nor whether it is appropriated or not. The water company board is the governing
body on these issues and have already taken care of this matter.
Finally, the alleged pipe installation obstruction in a drain ditch is a cause of
action that is totally unrelated to the facts pled in the original complaint.
As for the conspiracy and malicious prosecution claims: the facts were not pled
with specificity; that there was no proof of an agreement or concerted action among
defendants; that there was nothing more than conclusory allegations of conspiracy;
that a single defendant can not conspire alone, how can you have a meeting of the
minds between two, shy of being complete strangers, persons (between Utah County
employees).
Appellees would like to now address the ARGUMENTS which were entered on
Appellants' brief.
L

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEPUTY MORGAN
IS NOT A POLICYMAKER FOR UTAH COUNTYAND THEREFORE
LIABILITY CANNOT ATTACH TO UTAH COUNTY,
In Judge Stott's August 20, 2008 Memorandum Decision (R. 200-202)

"Plaintiffs have brought forth no allegations that official Utah County policy was
unconstitutional."
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In this same Memorandum (R. 203), Judge Stott states:
"Plaintiffs Notice of Claim was filed prematurely, did not
adequately identify the nature of the claims asserted,
and the time to file a proper Notice of Claim has expired.
On Judge Stotf s Order Dismissing Utah County Defendants (R 215, 216)
"....nor can Utah County be held liable for Section 1983 claims
under a theory of respondeat superior....99
"Plaintiffs brought claims for malicious prosecution and
conspiracy under 42 § U.S.C. 1983 against Utah County
Defendants. These claims are dismissed for failure to
State a claim for which relief can be granted, pursuant to
UtahR.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)"
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEPUTY MORGAN IS
ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FROM THE PINTARS' SECOND
AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION (MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND
CONSPIRACY PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C § 1983)

Also in Judge Stotf s August 20, 2008 Memorandum Decision (R. 203)
Utah County Defendants may claim relief under qualified immunity for discretionary
actions when the officers did not clearly know their actions were violative of the law,
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Section 1983 Claims must therefore be granted."
(R. 216) "To summarize, Plaintiffs complaint against Deputy Morgan and
Tonya Houck was filed prematurely, the notice of claim did not adequately identify the
nature of the claims asserted, and the time to file a proper Notice Of Claim has expired.
Therefore, Plaintiffs' state law claims against Utah County Defendants are forever
barred."

9

"The Court GRANTS Utah County Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs
Section 1983 claims, with prejudice, for the following reasons:
Tonya Houck and Deputy Morgan are entitled to qualified
immunity. Under the established qualified immunity framework,
Plaintiffs must allege facts showing that Tonya Houck and Deputy
Morgan violated Mr. Pintar's constitutional rights that were clearly
established such that a reasonable officer would know that the
conduct engaged in by them was clearly unlawful,...The fact that
the charges against Mr. Pintar later turned out to be
unsubstantiated does not make Tonya Houck's and Deputy
Morgan's actions unreasonable in light of the circumstances
prevailing at the time" (R.214).
(R200) ..." Plaintiffs have brought forth no allegations that official Utah County
policy was unconstitutional, and in the absence of evidence that Deputy Morgans' actions
constituted official policy, or that her decisions were reviewed and ratified by those
having official policy making authority, the PlaintifFs claim against the Defendants' for a
Section 1983 violation cannot stand."
Ill

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE
PINTARS LEAVE TO FILE THEIR SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT.

(R. 442) Plaintiffs seek to add two new causes of action (Second and Third Causes
of Action) and to "adequately plead the other causes of action stated in the original
Complaint" which are unrelated to the arrest incident. (See Plaintiffs' Supporting
Memorandum, 3:1). Plaintiffs knew of the additional facts and claims alleged prior to
filing the first Complaint on November 1, 2007. With respect to the First and Third
Causes of Action, and knew of the facts alleged in the Second Cause of Action on May

10

15, 2008. Plaintiffs argue that they were unable to move to amend their Complaint until
two months before the fact discovery deadline between the first year of this lawsuit
was focused on motions to dismiss the Utah County Defendants. These Motions did not
involve the Houcks. Plaintiffs argue that the other reason they were unable to move to
amend their Complaint is that the Houcks filed a complaint with the Utah State Bar
against Plaintiffs' attorney during a time when the Houcks were unrepresented by
counsel. Plaintiffs counsel did not ask the Court for a stay of the proceedings and it was
not a situation where counsel's own clients filed a bar complaint which would possibly
prohibit counsel from continuing with this lawsuit."
(R. 441) Finally, in addition to the new facts and causes of action being unrelated
to the original Complaint, Plaintiffs seek the following: 1) to have the Court declare that
it is legal for Plaintiffs' to flood Defendants' property (First Cause Of Action); 2) to have
the Court rule on an issue concerning the use of excess water which has already been
decided by the Westfield Irrigation Board and which issue properly belongs before the
Board (Second Cause of Action); and 3)specific performance relating to a drainage ditch
and pipe installed by the Houcks in that ditch (Third Cause Of Action). R 774 pg 11.

ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE DENIED TO LEAVE TO AMEND THEIR
COMPLAINT.
Rule 15 states that leave to amend a pleading shall be freely given when justice so

requires. Utah R.Civ.P. 15 (a) The factors the Court should consider in deciding whether
11

to allow amendment of pleadings include (1) whether the movant was aware of the facts
underlying the proposed amendment long before its filing; (2) the timeliness of the
motion; (3) the justification for the delay; and (4) any resulting prejudice to the
responding party. Jones v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 2003 UT App 355, f 16, 78 P3d
988 (citations omitted). While the motion to amend analysis is a multi-factored, flexible
inquiry that allows trial courts the leeway to evaluate the factual circumstances and legal
developments involved in each particular case, the circumstances of a particular case may
be such that a court's ruling on a motion to amend a pleading can be predicated on only
one or two of the particular factors. Kelly v. Hard Money Money, Inc., 2004 UT App, f^[
41-42, 87 P. 3d 734. The Court is not limited to these factors in making a determination
whether to grant or deny motions to amend pleadings. Id. At ^ 41-42."
(R.440) Discussed below are the reasons why the Court should deny Plaintiffs'
motion to amend their Complaint.
A. Plaintiffs' Reasons for the Delay in Seeking Leave to
Amend Complaint are Unjustified.
Plaintiffs give two reasons to justify their delay in moving to amend their
Complaint. First, Plaintiffs state that in 2008 the litigation was concentrated on the
defendants who have since been dismissed (Utah County, Tonya Houck, Sandra Morgan,
Kay Bryson, and Timothy Barnes) and that is why Plaintiffs were unable to move to
amend their Complaint sooner. See Plaintiffs9 Memorandum, 3:24-29. What essentially
transpired was the briefing on two motions to dismiss filed by those defendants and a
motion for bifurcation. The motions were heard on June 17, 2008 and were subsequently
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granted, and the motion for bifurcation was denied as moot Plaintiffs then sought to
appeal the decision and the appeal was dismissed on summary disposition in December
2008. This is not a valid reason for Plaintiffs' delay in seeking to amend their Complaint
with regard to claims against Martin and Darlene Houck because Martin and Darlene
Houck were not involved in those motions or in the appeal. It certainly was not a
situation where the amendment of the Complaint might depend on the outcome of the
motions to dismiss or on some discovery that was being conducted. In fact, there was not
even an attorneys' planning meeting or scheduling order entered in this case until April
2009 after current counsel entered her appearance.
The second reason Plaintiffs give to justify their delay is that Darlene Houck filed
complaint with the Utah State Bar against plaintiffs' counsel during a time when she was
unrepresented by counsel. Plaintiffs' state that "...the litigation was stopped dead in its
tracks... The Complaint was meritless*....Plaintiffs' counsel was so advised not to
(R.439) proceed further with the litigation until the bar complaint matter was cleared up."
Plaintiffs' Supporting Memorandum, 3:29 - 4:4. This excuse is likewise not a valid
reason for delay. The Houck's former attorney withdrew his representation in January
2009 so there was a period of time when the Houcks were without representation. On
February 23, 2009, Plaintiffs' attorney (and son), Jason Pintar, sent the Houcks a letter
essentially threatening them, among other things, not to bring their water dispute to the
Westfield Irrigation Board or Mr. Pintar would add more counts of defamation to the
lawsuit. (R 428 & R.427). The Houcks, still unrepresented by counsel, filed a complaint
against Mr. Pintar with the Utah State Bar Office Of Professional Conduct ("Bar
13

Complaint"). Although Mr. Pintar represents to this Court that the Bar Complaint was
meritless, the Office found otherwise, even though the Bar Complaint was dismissed on
other grounds, R.583 208:18 R. 582 209: 2, and R. 582 211:18 R.582 212:3. Mr. Pintar
also represents, in his Reply Brief Re: Pretrial Scheduling Conference at 2:25-26, that
he was "ordered to halt all work on this case..." It is apparent that "order" did not come
from this Court. Mr. Pintar could also have asked the Court to stay these proceedings but
he did not and continued to actively participate in this case during the time that 4Cthe
litigation was stopped dead in its tracks". Since the Bar Complaint was not filed by Mr.
Pintar's client, there is no justifiable reason for Mr. Pintar to blame the Bar Complaint for
his delay in seeking to amend the Complaint."
(R. 438) Plaintiffs' two reasons for the delay in seeking to amend the Complaint
(1) concentrating on one group of defendants by opposing motions to dismiss which did
not involve the Houcks, and (2) that a Bar Complaint was filed against him by someone
who was not his client, do not provide sufficient justification for any delay in seeking to
amend the Complaint a second time.
B The Houcks Would Be Prejudiced If the Court Allowed
Plaintiffs Leave To Amend Their Complaint
Plaintiffs inaccurately state that "the additional language that Plaintiff proposes to
add to the Complaint do not alter the landscape in any way." Plaintiffs' Supporting
Memorandum, 5:9-10. As argued throughout this brief, Plaintiffs seek to bring two
causes of (R. 437) action and plead numerous additional facts that are unrelated to their
original Complaint. On the January 19, 2010 Oral Arguments Transcript, pg. 15: line 6-
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12, Judge Mortensen stated: "I've considered all of the arguments here and I do
understand that -and—but I believe it's accurate that Mr. Pintar's argument is that a
multiplicity of litigation is typically to be avoided; however, given the current status of
this case and the plaintiffs' position that discovery has closed, the Court is going to deny
the motion for an amendment...." (lines 17-21):
Also on 1295 transcript: Pg. 9, line 24 - Pg. 10: 1-13 "...I just wanted to verify.
The assertion was made in the defendant's memoranda that there are no facts in the
amended complaint that were only recently discovered, those were all known at the time
of the original complaint; is that true? Mr. Pintar: With - no, it's not. With regard to
the- with the cause of action for specific performance that has to do with the obstruction
that was put in the drainage ditch. The discovery of the damage that that has been
causing has only happened within late 2008 and 2009, which is after the complaint was
filed. With regard to the controversy that's arisen with putting a lock on a head gate, that
occurred on or about May of 2008, which again, the—the original complaint was filed in
November Of'07."
In the March 26, 2010 Telephone Conference (1293), pg. 5: 20-23 "I already
mentioned this in oral arguments, the second amended complaint was - the motion to
amend to allow the second amended complaint was denied, therefore, the second
amended complaint is not a pleading before the Court, because I didn't allow it."
In the June 28, 2010 Motion For Summary Judgment (1294), pg. 52:2-5, "... I
hope I've communicated that for purposes of this case, we're not amending. And so,
we're going to take care of what's been pled in this complaint, in this action." In May 7,
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2010 Memorandum Decision, (1267) "More importantly, in this case this court denied the
motion to allow the second amended complaint.

Accordingly, the second amended

complaint has never become operative in this case."
"I find that the facts, if not known at the time the complaint was filed, were known
relatively shortly thereafter so that an amendment could have been brought far sooner.
Again, because the discovery is going to be considered closed, I think it would be
inappropriate to grant the amendment."
II

THE MOST IMPORTANT REASON TO DENY PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO AMEND IS FUTILITY.

A Court should deny motions to amend when the moving party seeks to assert a
new claim that is legally insufficient or futile. Tretheway v. Furstenau, 2001 UT App
400, U 19, 40 P.3d 649 (citations omitted).
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PINTARS'
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AS TO
THE HOUCKS.

First Cause of Action (Declaratory Judgment)
.In the original Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Houcks falsely asserted that
Plaintiffs had improperly managed their irrigation water causing flooding to the Houcks'
property, the source of the Houcks' allegation is a letter sent by Mr. Houck to Mr. Pintar,
dated July 23, 2004 In (1293)

Line 21, "...If our - we want to go back to what we

traditionally did and if it incidentally sends the water on the Houck property, so be it."
(R. 947) Plaintiffs also allege that the reason the Houcks' property was flooded with
Plaintiffs' irrigation water is the Houcks' failure to comply with the established
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procedures of the water company. Complaint dated November 1, 2009, If 14. R. 775, R.
776. R.780, pg 5: # 9: In the proposed Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs have
revised the facts concerning their declaratory judgment request and state the following:
"Plaintiffs request that this Court declare pursuant to applicable statute and common law
that Plaintiffs have the right to reasonably irrigate their property, and given the facts and
circumstances herein, if any water runs onto Defendants' property as a result of
Plaintiffs' reasonable irrigation of their property, said water running over is legal
and therefore not actionable by Defendants" . # 10 Plaintiffs have also changed their
claim that the Houcks "falsely alleged flooding to their property" as alleged in the
original Complaint to the "false assertion that Plaintiffs improperly and irresponsibly
irrigated their property." Proposed Second Amended Complaint fl46.' #11: Most
importantly. Plaintiffs no longer claim that the Houcks falsely asserted, in the July 8,
2004 letter, that the Pintars' irrigation water flooded their Property. See proposed Second
Amended Complaint." Based on the alleged misperceptions of the Houcks regarding the
flooding of their property by the Pintars, Plaintiffs proceed to outline facts about a
conspiracy among the Houcks, their daughter-in-law Tonya Houck who is employed as a
secretary at the Utah County Sheriffs Department, and Deputy Sandra Morgan to have
Mr. Pintar arrested for disorderly conduct complaint dated (R. 436) November 1, 2009,
Hf 15-16. The remaining factsflflf17-32) Concern allegations about how Deputy Morgan
and the other Utah County Defendants violated Mr. Pintar's civil right and maliciously
prosecuted Mr. Pintar, based on the alleged conspiracy with the Houcks. The First Cause
of Action is a request for declaratory judgment concerning the "determination of this
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Court declaring the respective rights, status and legal relationship between the parties
based upon statutes, ordinances, irrigation water stock, deeds, prior precedence, and
related matters affecting their duties and responsibilities" Complaint dated November 1,
2009, f 35. Plaintiffs do not offer any more specifics and instead simply rely on
overboard, conclusory allegations which are simply not enough to sustain this cause of
action. With regard to damages, Plaintiffs allege that as a result of the Houcks' alleged
misrepresentations stemming from the 2004 letter; they were forced to build a dike along
the field where the flooding took place to placate the Houcks.

Complaint dated

November 1,2009,1f70.
Now, Plaintiffs propose to amend the First Cause of Action "specifically" to ask
the Court to "declare pursuant to applicable statute and common law that Plaintiffs have
the right to reasonably irrigate their property, and given the facts and circumstances
herein, if any water runs onto Defendants'... property as a result of Plaintiffs' reasonable
irrigation of their property, said water running over is legal and therefore not actionable
by Defendants." Proposed Amended Complaint, Tf 70. In the Memorandum Decision,
May 7, 2010, (1265 & 1266): "Both Wayment and gardner address an appropriator's
right to continue use of a method of diversion. Diversion of water is not synonymous
with use of water. Diversion of water describes the method by which a water right holder
gets water to his property. Diversion of water does not describe anything concerning the
control of water onto property of others. The Wayment court did discuss a right to
continued historical use of water, but in no way does that case address the issues
presented her^. On the other hand, Utah law does address the issues presented here. In
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fact, a case identified by the Plaintiff at oral argument sets out some principles. In
Sanford v. University of Utah 488 P.2d 741, 744 (Utah 1971), the court acknowledged
doctrine of reasonable use for the discharge of surface waters. The Sanford court stated:
An unjustified invasion of a possessor's interest in
the use and enjoyment of his land through the
medium of surface waters is as much a tort as a
trespass or private nuisance produced by smoke or
smells. Nevertheless, the courts and writers seldom
analyzed the problems in terms of tortuous conduct,
causation or other tort concepts.
Id. (quoting Kinyon & McClure, Interference with Surface Waters, 24 MINN.
L. REV. 891, 936 (1940)
In Sanford the court adopted the Restatement (second) of Torts § 833: Nontrespassory invasions of a person's interest in the use and enjoyment of land resulting
from another's interference with the flow of surface water are governed by the rule stated
in §§ 822-831 Thus, in later cases the reasonable use doctrine was applied even in the
face of statutory mandate. The Utah Supreme Court in Erickson v. Bennion, 28 Utah 2d
371, 503 P.2d 139 (1972) noted that Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-8 provide: "The owner of
any ditch .. .or other watercourse shall maintain the same in repair so as to prevent waste
of water or damage to the property of others... The court in Erickson noted :

Notwithstanding the mandatory sound of the emphasized
words of that statute, it is our established law that users of
irrigation waters are not insurers against damages they may
cause. They are held only to the standard of care that is
generally applied import law; that which persons of ordinary
intelligence and prudence would observe under the
particular circumstances.
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This is not so different than the law provided in Provo City Ordinance 10.05.030 which
provides:
(1) Persons using water for irrigation within the limits
of the City shall be required to control all the water
distributed to them, and shall be liable for all damages
caused by their neglect
(3) It shall be unlawful for any person, so using or
conducting such water, to permit the same to flood
the street, sidewalks or private property or to run to
unnecessary waste (.)
The court, of course, is not relying on this provision, but only notes its consistency
with st^te law already established. Erickson, 28 Utah 2d at 373-74. Therefore, Utah law
provides that the Pintars must use reasonable care in the use of their water so as not to
damage the property of their neighbors.
In the Telehone Conference (1293 ), dated March 26, 2010, pg. 9, line 20 - Pg. 10,
line 8: ".. .we're stipulating that this water has traveled, it's been, for the purposes of the
motion, we're going to assume that it was properly and reasonably diverted in a quantity
that did not exceed their rights with the irrigation canal company and that it incidentally
flowed downhill onto the Houcks' property and what the declaratory judgment action is
seeking is a declaration from the Court that if that happens, there cannot be liability to the
Pintars and if - if a party is supposed to do something about it, the onus is on Houcks to
do something, create a berm or other obstacle so that the flooding does not occur. Is that
right Mr. Pintar? Mr Pintar: Yes, your Honor.
Iji the original Complaint, as noted above, Plaintiffs allege that the Houcks falsely
accused Plaintiffs of flooding their property with irrigation water. Now Plaintiffs want to
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amend the Complaint to ask the Court to declare that the Plaintiffs have the right to flood
the Houcks' property. Plaintiffs offer no legal support for the outlandish proposition that
(R. 435). Plaintiffs should be allowed to flood the Houcks9 property with their irrigation
water, which will damage the Houcks' corrals and their livestock, instead of containing
the water on their own property.
In 1268 : " As stated in a supplemental telephonic hearing this Court attempted to
perform its duty by asking plaintiffs9 counsel exactly what declaratory relief was being
sought. In response to this questioning, it appears that plaintiffs1" seek a declaratory
judgment specifically that they are entitled under the law to allow their irrigation water to
run onto the defendants' property. The problem with plaintiffs assertion is that such a
conclusion is not supported by Utah law." (1263) "The Houcks are under no duty to
perform any act or effort to keep water from running onto their property."
(1264): "Utah law likewise answers the question as to whether a person is under a
duty to protect their private property from surface water running onto it. In Reeder
v.Brigham City, supra, the court stated: "(The adjoining landowner) has the right to be
freefromreceiving waters on his lands to his damage which do not find their way in their
natural course and under natural conditions."
In {1269): "The complaint upon close review does not indicate exactly what a
bona fide dispute is, nor what "matters" are to be addressed in a declaratory judgment
action. Para^aph 36 comes closer than any other paragraph, not seeking a declaratory
judgment as to the Plaintiffs rights or duties, but only seeking new declaratory judgment
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adjudicating the specific responsibilities and duties to "Defendants Martin and Darlene
Houck" regarding the use and management of irrigation water between the properties."
(1293) pg. 4—7, addresses the Plaintiffs' intention for declaratory judgment ruling
on the right to water our property in the same manner as we have for decades of usage....
And if that incidentally puts water onto the Houck property, then you want a declaration
that you can't be liable for that. Mr. Pintar "Correct". And are you seeking a declaration
that if the Houcks don't like it, they need to do something about it? Mr. Pintar
"Correct".

Second Cause Of Action (Declaratory Judgment).

Next, Plaintiff wants to insert another declaratory judgment action unrelated to the
facts pled in the original Complaint "The power of the court to permit an amendment of
pleadings does not extend so far as to permit the importation of an entirely new and
different cause of action". Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.v. Clegg 135 P.2d 919,
922-23 (Utah 1943); see also Crane v. Crane, 131 P.2d 1022, 1023 (Utah 1942) (a new
and different cause of action cannot be injected under the guise of an amendment to a
complaint). Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action asks the Court to declare that the Houcks
have no right to flow unappropriated water across the Pintars' property and that Plaintiffs
have the right to block the flow of that water. Proposed Amended Complaint, Tflf 52-54.
Plaintiffs have not presented the entire picture concerning this issue.
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The headgate referred to by Plaintiffs, which is believed to be located on the LDS
Church property, allows unappropriated excess water to flow through the Westfield
Irrigation Company supply ditch running east to west at the south end of the properties
owned by the Pintars, the Binks, and the Houcks, in that order. Plaintiff Lewis

Pintar

had placed a lock on the headgate, at the direction of his attorney and in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 73-1-14, to prevent the Houcks from taking the excess water down the
ditch.

This issue appropriately

belongs before the Westfield Irrigation board and in

fact, was resolved by the Westfield Irrigation Board on May 15, 2008.
(R. 434) which mentioned a confrontation that consisted of a locked head gate and
refusing to let others water. Excess water must be treated the same as a regular turn. The
water master has to be the mediator ... the shareholders have the right to excess water but
they must contact the water master prior to use of it

No one has the right to stop

someone else from watering. A locked head gate is obstruction. The Board further
clarified the issue on February 4,2009:
Other business brought before the board was the
concern of the excess water running down the
ditch unassigned and who is entitled to use the
water.. .Policy for this water is to obtain approval
through the water master prior to use of it.
In the Spanish Fork Westfield Irrigation Company, Board Of Directors minutes,
dated February 4, 2009, the Westfield Irrigation Board has established procedures for
accessing the water that Plaintiffs complain runs through the ditch in front of their
property and in front of the Binks property and the Houck property. This issue has been
resolved by the Westfield Irrigation Board and in the event any further such issues arise,
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the appropriate course of action is for Plaintiffs to contact the Westfield Irrigation Board,
not seek a declaratory judgment from the Court. (R. 594 120:11-25).
(1267).. .within the purview of rule 56(d) this court has attempted to narrow some
of the issues presented by the declaratory judgment action. First, Westfield Irrigation
Company is not a party to this matter. As a result, any judgment of this court cannot as a
matter of law adjudicate any duties or obligations of Westfield Irrigation Company. The
only rights which can be adjudicated are those between the Pintars and the Houcks.
(1268) The parties acknowledged and agreed in the telephonic hearing that there
were no factual disputes pertinent to the declaratory judgment. Thus, the only question
remaining is whether the declaratory relief sought is legally sustainable. The court
concludes that it is not.
(1269) In sum, Plaintiffs should not be allowed to amend Complaint to Include this
cause of action because (1) it is unrelated to the original Complaint; (2) the matter has
been resolved by the irrigation board; (3) the water master and the irrigation board are
best suited and with authority to resolve any disputed over the use of that water; and (4)
other parties whose rights would be affected, such as the Westfield Irrigation Company,
the Binks, and potentially the LDS Church, will need to be (R. 433) brought into the
lawsuit since any issue concerning the headgate and the flow of water will affect their
rights as well.
Third Cause of Action (Specific Performance).
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In their Third (and entirely new) Cause of Action, Plaintiffs seek to bring claims
against the Houcks concerning the alleged obstruction of a drain ditch which runs east to
west along 4780 South on the northern boundary of the properties belonging to the
Houcks, the Pintars, and the Roaches. Plaintiffs allege that the drainage pipe which the
Houcks installed subsequent to the purchase of their property in 1991 is too small and is
the main source of alleged problems concerning the ditch. Plaintiffs should not be
allowed to amend their Complaint to include this cause of action because the original
Complaint has no references whatsoever to this cause of action or any facts concerning
this cause of action. As noted above, and supported by Hartford and Crane, Plaintiffs
should not be allowed to add a cause of action that is totally unrelated to the facts pled in
the original Complaint.

II.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND IS UNTIMELY

In Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Company, 854 P.2d 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993),
the appeals court affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant leave to amend their
complaint. "An amendment would certainly have delayed the trial and the substance of
plaintiffs new allegation was known a full year earlier..." Id. At 1028. The motion to
amend came at approximately the same time defendant moved for summary judgment. Id.
at 1027.
With respect to the First Cause of Action, Plaintiffs knew of the additional facts
alleged prior to filing their original Complaint on November 1, 2007. In Fact, the
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flooding incident complained of took place sometime in July, 2004 as well as in earlier
years. (R.432) Yet Plaintiffs waited more than five years after incident and two years
since the original Complaint was filed to seek amendment of their Complaint.
With respect to the Second Cause of Action concerning the headgate issue, that
issue was resolved by the Westfield Irrigation Board on May 15, 2008. At that time,
Plaintiffs knew of the facts they now allege but waited a year and a half later to ask the
Court for a declaratory judgment on an issue that had already been resolved.
With respect to the Third Cause of Action concerning specific performance,
Plaintiffs allege a cause of action for specific performance concerning a pipe installed by
the Houcks in a drain ditch. Plaintiffs allege that the pipe was installed after the Houcks
purchased the property in 1991. Mr. Houck acknowledges in his deposition that the
changes to the drainage ditch were made "less than five years ago." Therefore, the time
frame extends from after 1991 when the Houcks purchased their property to around late
2002 or shortly thereafter, when the pipe was purchased and then installed. These events
took place several years prior to filing the original Complaint. Again, Plaintiffs knew of
these alleged problems at least at the time they filed their original Complaint but failed to
plead those facts or bring the Third Cause of Action until now.

Houcks had no prior

knowledge of an obstruction in the ditch nor about any alleged Pintar property flooding
until this allegation was filed in the Second Amended Complaint.

V & VI THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PINTARS'
THIRD AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION FOR CONSPIRACY
PURSUANT TO TITLE 42 U.S.C. § 1983 AND CIVIL CONSPIRACY
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AS TO THE HOUCKS AND THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ...AS TO THE HOUCKS'
(R. 773)

Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action alleges malicious prosecution under

Section 1983 for the proceedings stemming from Mr. Pintar^s booking for disorderly
conduct, which Plaintiffs allege were instituted and maintained in the absence of probable
cause. Tied in with the malicious prosecution claim are Plaintiffs' claims of negligent and
intentional misrepresentation concerning information they provided to Deputy Morgan.
Deputy Morgan investigated their complaints about the Pintars based on her judgment,
issued a disorderly conduct citation to Mr. Pintar. Deputy Morgan then turned the matter
over to the Utah County Attorney's Office...Plaintiffs maintain that the Houcks, private
individuals, acted in concert with state actors to prosecute Mr. Pintar by supplying them
with false information However, reporting perceived criminal activity alone does not
show that an individual assisted in bringing a criminal charge when the responding
officer subsequently brings such charges. Smith v. Colorado Sears Roebuck, 21 Fed.
Appx. 796, 801 (10th Cir. 2001).
Moreover, when a plaintiff attempts to assert the state action required for a
Section 1983 claim against private actors based on a conspiracy with government actors,
"mere conclusory (R.772) allegations with no supporting factual averments are
insufficient" Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1073 (10th Cir. 2005) ^citations omitted).
Rather, the plaintiff must specifically plead "facts tending to show agreement and
concerted action." Id.
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(R.772)

The basis for Plaintiffs' Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action

(Section 1983 claims of malicious prosecution and conspiracy, and state law claim of
conspiracy) relies on Plaintiffs' assertion that the Houcks acted with the Utah County
Defendants to falsely charge Mr. Pintar with disorderly conduct. Plaintiffs' allegations
rest on the alleged "friendship" between Deputy Susan Morgan who investigated the
Houcks' complaint and with Tonya Houck, the Houcks^ daughter-in-law who is
employed as a secretary with the Utah County Sheriffs Office. (780) "... Plaintiffs'
allege that Defendant Susan Morgan, a Deputy Utah County Sheriff, had a personal and
friendly working relationship with Defendant, Tonya Houck, who was employed at the
Utah County Sheriffs Office and who is also the Houcks' daughter-in-law Complaint,
Tfl6.

This allegation, that forms the basis for the Second, Third and Fourth Causes of

Action, has been proven untrue. In the depositions of Susan Morgan (R. 688) 26: 13-25
& 18-25 and Tonya Houck, (R.715) 33:22- 34: 3 & 34: 25-35:2 & 49 14-21 both women
testified that there was no friendship, and that they did not even know each other. Thus,
there could not have been a conspiracy between the Houcks and these women to bring
charges against Mr. Pintar. Further, all state actors have been dismissed from the lawsuit
and the Houcks are not state actors. (1294) 39: 21-25: Pintar states:
" Because a close relative that works at the Sheriffs Department, the sheriff shows
up and says, hey, we Have a close relative that works here, okay, WINK, WINK, I'll
take care of you. Okay? That's our argument. And that's the fact that we - based on
those facts , its perfectly—."
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To sustain a conspiracy claim under Section 1983, a Plaintiff must allege specific
facts showing an agreement and concerted action among defendants. Cardoso v. Calbone,
490 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir.2007) (citing Tonkovich v. Kansas Board of Regents. 159
F.3d 504, 533 (10th Cir. 1998)). Conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to
state a valid Section 1983 claim. Tonkovich v. Kansas Board of Regents, 159 F.3d 504,
533 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1994)
Reporting perceived criminal activity alone does (R. 771) not show that an individual
assisted an officer in bringing a criminal charge when the responding officer
subsequently brings such charges. Smith v. Colorado Sears Roebuck, 21 Fed. Appx.796,
801 (10th Cir. 2001).
As with the malicious prosecution claim Plaintiffs present us with nothing more
than conclusory allegations of conspiracy based on the following facts concerning Tonya
Houck: (1) Ms. Houck is employed as a secretary in the Judicial Services Division of the
Utah County Sheriffs Office; (2) Ms. Houck happens to be the daughter- In-law of
codefendants Darlene and Martin Houck; and (3) Ms. Houck has an alleged friendship
with Deputy Morgan. (Complaint, 1f 16) The testimony given by Tonya Houck and
Deputy Morgan in their respective depositions show that none of these allegations are
true and Plaintiffs have no proof of a concerted agreement and action among the other
Utah County Defendants rising to the level of a conspiracy under Section 1983. A single
defendant or in this case, the Houcks, by definition, cannot conspire alone. Further, since
the Court agreed to dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims, then
there is no claim of a civil rights violation to which a conspiracy claim under Section
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1983 can attach. See Cline II v. State of Utah 142 P.3 127m 136 (Utah App. 2005).
Therefore, the Section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution and conspiracy, as well as
the civil conspiracy claim rightfully so were dismissed.
(R. 1262)... Defendants argue that the crux of the plaintiffs5 argument is the alleged
relationship between Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck and that plaintiffs have not
forwarded any evidence that these individuals knew each other beyond having heard one
another's names. This Court concurs and finds that the plaintiffs' facts do not support a
claim for conspiracy and that claim fails as a matter of law.
(R. 1261) To support a cause of action for Section 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff
must allege specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action among the
defendants. Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Tonkovich
v. Kansas Board of Regents, 159 F 3d 504, 533 (10th Cir. 1998). A plaintiff must also
show that "both public and private actors share a common, unconstitutional goal." Anaya
v. Crossroads Managed Care sys.f 195 F 3d 584, 596 (10th Cir. 1999). Whether or not
there is a conspiracy is typically a question of fact.

See Gallagher v. Neil Young

Freedom Concert 49 F.3d 1442, 1448 (10th Cir. 1995); Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar
Co.2002 UT 69, f^f 35-36. However, A court may grant summary judgment on an issue
that is normally a question of fact if no reasonable jury could conclude that fact exists.
Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing Co.y 844 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992). See also Raab v.
Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61, f 50; White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994);
Clover v. Snowbird Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1991). When a jury would be left
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to speculation, the action fails as a matter of law. Harline v. Baker, 912 P.2d 433, 439
(Utah 1996)
Both civil conspiracy and Section 1983 conspiracy require that the co-conspirators
have a "meeting of the minds" or agreement, which is the central issue of dispute in this
case. Plaintiffs argue the circumstantial evidence they have submitted infers a meeting of
the minds. Although the court must assume Plaintiffs' facts for purposes of summary
judgment, it does not have to assume any asserted inferences. Holland v. Columbia Iron
Mining Co., 4 Utah 2d 303, 306 (1956)
(R. 1260) Inferences are made for the purpose of aiding reason, not to override it.
Inferences are nothing more than probable or natural explanation of facts." Id. at 306307. In this case, the court cannot reasonably infer from the evidence given that there was
a meeting of the minds. Though circumstantial evidence may by itself support a cause of
action for conspiracy, the evidence given in this instance is insufficient to provide a jury
with a reasonable basis for such a finding. Pivotal to the allegation that there was a
meeting of the minds is the supposed relationship between Deputy Morgan and Tonya
Houck.

Defendants' hostility and Deputy Morgan's haphazard investigation taken

together prove nothing by themselves, but might support a theory of conspiracy if an
underlying relationship was shown to exist between the actors. However, no real
relationship has been shown or even alleged. The only basis upon which the Plaintiffs
rest their allegation of conspiracy is that the parties are aware that they both work for the
Utah County Sheriffs Department an agency that employs hundreds of people. The
depositions of Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck quoted in the motions clearly show that,
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though the parties had heard of each other, they did not know each other personally. The
Plaintiffs do not dispute this. Thus, evidence in this case is that Tonya Houck and
Deputy Morgan were just shy of complete strangers. The court cannot reasonably infer
from this circumstance that a conspiracy existed, and no reasonable jury could believe
this basis to be sufficient for a finding that there was a meeting of the minds. Therefore,
Defendants9 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on the Section 1983 conspiracy
and civil conspiracy claims. (R. 1259) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' malicious
prosecution claim is void as a matter of law because simply reporting perceived criminal
activity cannot qualify as malicious prosecution. According to Smith v. Colorado Sears
Roebuck 21 Fed. Appx. 796, 801 (10th Or. 2001). The court finds that the plaintiffs'
1983 malicious prosecution claim cannot survive because plaintiffs have not shown that
the prosecution was done "under color of state law" as applied to the Houcks. The federal
statute for malicious prosecution states:

Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation.. .subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity or other proceeding for redress... (.).
42U.S.C. § 1983.
In a Section 1983 suit, the plaintiffs have to prove: (1) that there was continued
confinement or prosecution; (2) that the original action terminated in favor of the
plaintiff, (3) that there was no probable cause to support the original arrest, continued
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confinement, or prosecution; (4) that the defendant acted with malice; and (5) that the
plaintiff sustained damages. Novitsky v.City of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir.
2007)(quoting Pierce v. Gilchrist 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff must also
show that the defendant acted "under color of state law", in other words, that the
defendant participated in joint action with the State or its agents, Dennis v. Sparks, 449
U.S. 24, 27 (1980). To assert that the arrest was a "state action" in a conclusory allegation
without a sufficient factual foundation is insufficient, the pleadings must present facts
tending to show agreement and concerted action. Smith v. Colorado Sears Roebuck, 21
Fed. Appx 796, 800 (10th Cir. 2001).
In order to assert a claim of 1983 malicious prosecution with regard to the Houcks,
plaintiffs must assert facts tending to show agreement and concerted action with Deputy
Morgan to deprive plaintiffs of a constitutional right. Whether there was an agreement
and concerted action would typically be a question of fact, as referenced above. However,
as also aforementioned, this court may grant a motion for summary judgment,
notwithstanding a question of fact, if no reasonable jury could conclude that fact exists.
In the previous section, this court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that there
was a conspiracy or a meeting of the minds between the Houcks and Deputy Morgan
given the facts alleged by the plaintiffs. Setting aside averments of conspiracy, the only
evidence that the Houcks acted in concert or agreement with a state actor is their
complaints to the Utah County Sheriffs Office and Deputy Morgan. However, reporting
suspected criminal activity or filing a complaint against an individual does not fulfill the
"under color of state law" requirement of Section 1983. Pinov. Higgs, 73 F.3d 1461,
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1465 (10th Cir. 1996) (private party reported defendant was engaging in criminal activity,
Sykes v. California, (R. 1257) 497 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1974) (private party filed a complaint
against defendant). See also Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1975); Brooks v.
Peters, 322 F Supp 1273 (DC Wis 1971); Kahermanes v. Marchese, 361 F.Supp. 168
(DC Pa 1973); Weyandt v. Mason fs Stores, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 283 (DC Pa 1968). Because
Mr. Pintar's alleged constitutional deprivation was not done under color of state law, the
plaintiffs cannot sustain their 1983 malicious prosecution claim. Thus, defendants'
motion for summary judgment on the 1983 malicious prosecution claim is granted.
Appelee's note: After repeated perceived threats by the Appellants and their two
sons towards Appellees, the mere number of these incidents, Appellees deemed it
necessary to contact the authorities for assistance. The government provides civilian
protection through their law enforcement agencies. Appellees cited their issues with the
Sheriff Department responding officer, it was only coincidental that on most of the
occasions Deputy Morgan was the responder. Once the statements were taken by the
Officer, Appellees were no longer involved, nor did they have input as to what action, if
any, the authorities undertook. In fact, it came as a complete surprise to hear of
Appellant Lewis booking. Appellees do not think that it is against the law to ask a law
enforcement agency for assistance There has been no new evidence, and the laws have
not changed; so Appellees believe that the Honorable Judge David Mortensen and
Honorable Judge Gary D. Stott dismissals should be upheld.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, this Court should UPHOLD the District Court's
decisions regarding the following:
L Second Cause of Action for Malicious Prosecution,
Third Cause of Action for conspiracy,
As to Utah County;
2. Second Cause of Action for Malicious Prosecution
Third Cause of Action for conspiracy
As to Deputy Morgan;
3. .Leave To File Proposed Second Amended Complaint
4. First Cause of Action - Declaratory Relief
As to the Houcks
5.

Second Cause Of Action for Malicious Prosecution
Third Cause Of Action for Conspiracy
Fourth Cause of Action for Civil Conspiracy
As to the Houcks

^%£fw£,. Jo / 4 ^ ^ ^ M a r t i n G. Houck, pro se

Darlene Houck, pro se
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